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involve cross-domain integration of persons, objects, actions, space,
and time, and there is good evidence that such representations
provide conceptual input to early language (Toma-sello 1992). De-
layed imitation in later infancy is based on event representations
and provides a prelinguistic social-experiential semi-symbolic
cognitive representation (Donald 1991). At the perceptual, motor,
and nonsymbolic level of the cognitive system, automatic non-
conscious processes continue to subserve both the nonlinguistic
conceptual and linguistic representations. Non-domain-specific
conceptual processes, including language, may be thought of as
layers added to earlier evolved cognitive operations.
A transition period of language practice in social contexts con-
tinues up to the fifth or sixth year when linguistic representations
and processing supplement the basic experience-based system. I
have proposed a dual process theory to explain the important ad-
vances in cognitive development during the preschool years (ages
3–5) (Nelson 1996; in press; Nelson et al. 2003). Specifically, the
achievement of representational language supplements the initial
nonlinguistic experientially based conceptual system with a sec-
ond linguistic representation component available to the cognitive
processing system. Among other things, this enables holding in
mind two competing or complementary representations at the
same time (e.g., past and present states of affairs, first- and sec-
ond-person perspective on the same event, etc.), with implications
for performance on theory of mind tasks and category choice
tasks, as well as self-reflective thought. The achievement of rep-
resentational language involves the acquisition of complex se-
mantics and syntax necessary to express propositional thoughts
about things not evident in the immediate scene, such as descrip-
tions, explanations, narratives, plans, and so on. This level of lan-
guage competence, which follows several years of conversational
practice with adults, particularly those concerned with the past
and future, is reached by about four to five years of age.
Subsequently, domain-specific conceptual structures and asso-
ciated learning and memory strategies begin to be constructed
and consolidated, in collaboration with the social-cultural world
that defines useful domains such as writing and arithmetic, poetry
and physics, or alternatively, hunting and gathering, spinning and
woodworking (see also Karmiloff-Smith 1992). Such domain-spe-
cific knowledge does not of course prevent children or normal
adults from engaging in cross-domain thinking, either in science
or in everyday life.
In summary, language is a cross-domain communicative and
cognitive representational system made possible by a preexisting
non-domain-specific conceptual system perhaps unique to human
cognition. Together they compose a dual representation cognitive
processing system of the extraordinary flexibility and power that
we are familiar with.
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Abstract: Carruthers presents evidence concerning the cross-modular in-
tegration of information in human subjects which appears to support the
“cognitive conception of language.” According to this conception, lan-
guage is not just a means of communication, but also a representational
medium of thought. However, Carruthers overlooks the possibility that
language, in both its communicative and cognitive roles, is a nonrepre-
sentational system of conventional signals – that words are not a medium
we think in, but a tool we think with. The evidence he cites is equivocal
when it comes to choosing between the cognitive conception and this rad-
ical communicative conception of language.
Reflection on our phenomenology furnishes two very different
views of the role of natural language in human cognition. On the
one hand, as Carruthers observes at the beginning of the target ar-
ticle, we are constantly running words and sentences through our
heads, even when performing quite trivial cognitive tasks. This
provides some support for what Carruthers terms the “cognitive
conception of language,” according to which natural language
constitutes a representational medium of thought. On the other
hand, there is the familiar feeling that our thoughts are present in
some form before we attempt to express them in natural language
(“I know what I want to say, I just don’t know how to say it”). This
feeling is more consistent with what Carruthers terms the “com-
municative conception of language,” which denies that natural
language is a representational medium of thought and holds in-
stead that its role is restricted to the communication of thoughts
coded in other representational media.
Because phenomenology doesn’t settle this question, and be-
cause one of his aims is to defend the cognitive conception of lan-
guage, Carruthers turns to the empirical evidence. His trump card
is a series of experiments conducted by Hermer-Vazquez et al.
(1999), which suggest that natural language has a crucial role in
the human capacity to integrate information across different do-
mains (in this case geometric information and information con-
cerning object-properties). Carruthers concludes (as do Hermer-
Vazquez et al.) that natural language performs this integrating
function by acting as a mental lingua franca: a medium for repre-
senting items of information drawn from distinct domain-specific
modules in the brain.
In our view, however, the situation is not so straightforward. We
accept, on the basis of the experimental evidence Carruthers pre-
sents, that natural language contributes to the cross-modular inte-
gration of information in human subjects. What we question is the
further claim that it does so by acting as a representational medium
(and hence that the cited experimental work vindicates the cogni-
tive conception of language). Carruthers does allow that language
can influence cognition without acting as an (internal) representa-
tional medium, because it both sculpts and scaffolds cognition (sect.
2). But, as he points out, the function of language in these cases is
primarily diachronic – it contributes to the acquisition of certain
cognitive capacities rather than the real-time exercise of those ca-
pacities. Consequently, such processes are incapable of accounting
for the synchronic integration of internally coded information, and
the cognitive conception of language appears to be obligatory.
However, we believe that Carruthers has overlooked a significant
cognitive role for language that is both synchronic and consistent
with the communicative conception – one, moreover, that has the
potential to account for the cross-modular integration of informa-
tion in human subjects. To demonstrate this we’ll need to consider
the communicative conception of language in more detail.
What distinguishes the communicative and cognitive concep-
tions of language is that the former excludes natural language from
among the human brain’s representational media of thought. Nat-
ural language is in the communication business, not the thinking
business. Most proponents of this view accept that language en-
ables communication precisely because it is a representational
medium, but deny that it is a medium of thought. Some go fur-
ther. Robert Cummins, for example, argues that written and ver-
bal tokens of natural language communicate thoughts, not by rep-
resenting them, but merely by acting as conventional “signals” that
trigger appropriate representing vehicles in target brains (see es-
pecially Cummins 1996, pp. 135–40). Such signals are produced
when representing vehicles in a source brain interact with motor
systems via mechanisms that realize the governing conventions of
language. And they influence the receiving brain by impacting on
its sensory surfaces. Communication succeeds when the emitted
signals cause the receiving brain to token vehicles in its represen-
tational medium of thought whose contents are sufficiently simi-
lar to those tokened in the source brain. Cummins’s insight is that
linguistic signals need not (indeed should not) be conceived as
content-bearers to explain their role in this process.
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This more radical communicative conception of natural lan-
guage is echoed in a recent paper by Paul Churchland, who adds
an interesting twist. He claims that language is not a system for
representing the world, but the “acquired skill of perceiving . . .
and manipulating . . . the brain activities of your conspecifics, and
of being competent, in turn, to be the subject of reciprocal brain-
manipulation” (Churchland 2001). From this perspective, lan-
guage is not just a means of communicating thoughts but also a
way for one brain to shape the cognitive activities of another – lin-
guistic signals fundamentally operate as a means by which we ma-
nipulate the contents and trajectory of thought in other people.
What sort of cognitive role does this leave for natural language?
Clearly, sculpting and scaffolding are not ruled out, but a far more
significant possibility is that the communicative process we have
described also goes on inside individual brains. It was Vygotsky’s
great insight that after children acquire a natural language as a tool
for communication, they internalise it, that is, they appropriate it
as a cognitive tool (Vygotsky 1962/1986). For Vygotsky, as for Car-
ruthers, this process is one in which an external communicative
scheme becomes an internalized representational medium. What
we are suggesting, by contrast, is that the internalisation of natural
language is a process whereby a conventionally governed set of
communicative signals is put to work inside a single brain. Lan-
guage becomes a system of signals apt not only for manipulating
the brains of others, but also for recurrent self-manipulation. Such
internalisation involves establishing communicative links (routed
through the language centres) that can be employed by one part
of the brain to steer the cognitive activities occurring in other parts
of the brain.1 In this picture, natural language is not an internal
representational medium, it is a powerful cognitive tool – one that
establishes coherent, multimodal representations, by facilitating
communication within the brain, and regulates the sequencing of
thought via the constant interplay between networks that encode
linguistic signals and those that encode thoughts (for a fuller dis-
cussion, see O’Brien & Opie 2002).
There is emerging evidence that language, implemented pri-
marily in temporal cortex, plays just this kind of role. Recurrent
connections that loop from language centres out to the repre-
senting vehicles they trigger, and back again, catch up language
and thought in a tight web of mutual influence that extends our
cognitive capacities well beyond those of infraverbal organisms.
Such connections may well function to integrate information
across the brain’s perceptual and conceptual faculties, without re-
course to a linguiform medium of thought. What we are propos-
ing is a synchronic, fully internalized cognitive role for language
that is consistent with the communicative conception. As we have
put it elsewhere (O’Brien & Opie 2002), words are not a medium
we think in, they are a tool we think with. The possibility of this
radical communicative conception of language is one that Car-
ruthers has failed to consider. And the empirical evidence he cites
is equivocal when it comes choosing between his favoured cogni-
tive conception and the alternative we have sketched.
NOTE
1. This idea is somewhat similar to (but not identical with) the specu-
lations that Dennett makes about the role of natural language in organiz-
ing our thinking (see, e.g., Dennett 1991, pp. 193–99).
Speech as an opportunistic vehicle 
of thinking
Csaba Pléh
Center for Cognitive Science, Budapest University of Technology and
Economics, Budapest, Hungary. pleh@itm.bme.hu
http://www.itm.bme.hu/ktk/csaba
Abstract: Carruthers clearly identifies the basic issues involved in lan-
guage and thought relations and argues for an adaptive central model. Sim-
ilar conclusions were reached by classical research in the inner speech 
tradition. Sokolov (1968; 1972) especially emphasized that inner speech
appears only when the task is difficult. The use of inner speech is not a ne-
cessity to transform representations, but it is called for when transforma-
tions become difficult. This might be related to the cognitive reorganiza-
tions leading to language as emphasized by Donald (2001).
The clear differentiation by Carruthers between two basic ques-
tions involved in the complex language and thought interface is-
sue, namely, the involvement of language as a system and speech
as an actual bodily process, on the one hand, and the mandatory
or adaptive involvement of linguistic systems in thought, on the
other, is a most welcome effort in the domain of cognitive science.
In my commentary I shall concentrate on two issues: What can we
learn in this regard from traditional experimental work on dual
tasks in the inner speech research tradition, and how should one
envisage the shaping of domain general or cross-domain mecha-
nisms in the genesis of human cognition?
As Carruthers points out, cognitive science usually starts off
from a communicative conception of language when dealing with
the language-thought relationship. This is, according to Car-
ruthers, Fodor’s (1983) input/output modules. There is, however,
another work of Fodor (1975), the one Carruthers has in mind
when he talks about the outputs of mental modules, that is, the
Fodor of the language of thought, where an abstract proposition
like representation is claimed to be the vehicle of any internal
thought process. However, this claim is being made with no clear
position regarding whether this lingua mentis is related to actual
speech in either its genesis or its workings.
Determination in its different forms and scaffolding character-
ize the argumentation in the language and thought literature as
Carruthers surveys it, from the conceptual analysis of philosophy
through the studies on category use in cultural interactions down
to laboratory research on inner speech. One can summarize and
extend the different existing positions in Table 1.
Carruthers presents a rather well-argued view according to
which central process modularity should be reconciled with a
weakened version of linguistic determinism to the effect that lan-
guage is used as a central mediator between modules, as the ve-
hicle, if you wish, for the outputs of central processes – along the
line of Fodor (1975) – which is used to compute complex trains of
representations. I basically agree with this type of limited and
adaptive linguistic determinism, and with the evolutionary argu-
ments put forth in favor of it. One could enrich the evolutionary
tracing by realizing how the scaffolding introduced by culture sup-
plements or organizes the mental workings postulated by Car-
ruthers. I have in mind specifically the position of Merlin Donald
(1991; 1993; 2001) who claims that language and then writing in-
volve feedbacks toward our own cognitive architectures (see Pléh
2002.) Donald claims, “We are a culturally bound species and live
in a symbiosis with our collective creation. We seek culture, as
birds seek the air. In return, culture shapes our minds, as a sculp-
tor shapes clay” (Donald 2001, p. 300).
This is a nontrivial issue, because it touches on the way we con-
ceive the relationships between the external social world, together
with the communicative functions of language and the cognitive
domain and functions. There is disagreement about this, but I do
not wish to it solve here, just to allude to it with another quote from
Donald (2001, p. 254). “The great divide in human evolution was
not language, but the formation of cognitive communities in the
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